This paper analyzes the spillovers of higher U.S. interest rates on economic activity in a large panel of 50 advanced and emerging economies. We allow the response of GDP in each country to vary according to its exchange rate regime, trade openness, and a vulnerability index that includes current account, foreign reserves, inflation, and external debt. We document large heterogeneity in the response of advanced and emerging economies to U.S. interest rate surprises. In response to a U.S. monetary tightening, GDP in foreign economies drops about as much as it does in the United States, with a larger decline in emerging economies than in advanced economies. In advanced economies, trade openness with the United States and the exchange rate regime account for a large portion of the contraction in activity. In emerging economies, the responses do not depend on the exchange rate regime or trade openness, but are larger when vulnerability is high.
Introduction
This paper presents new empirical evidence regarding the cyclical response of foreign economies to U.S. monetary shocks. We make use of a large dataset exploiting the time-series and crosssectional variation of foreign economies in their exchange rate regime, trade openness, and an index of their external vulnerability. Our goal is to gain some empirical sense of the differential importance of exchange rate channels, trade channels and broad "financial" channels in response to changes in U.S. interest rates. Unlike previous studies that have focused on limited time periods, a few countries, or limited controls, we rely on a comprehensive dataset containing observations on quarterly GDP and time-varying country characteristics for 50 foreign economies for over 50 years. While data quality in international datasets varies systematically across countries and over time, we believe this is a reasonable price to pay for a dataset that, by exploiting nearly 10,000
observations, is about two orders of magnitude larger than the typical dataset used to study the domestic effects of U.S. monetary shocks. The non-uniform pattern of the bars across countries and episodes illustrates how the experience in the aftermath of U.S. monetary tightenings varies across foreign economies. The high interest rates of the late 1970s-early 1980s eventually led to lackluster growth in the United States and most foreign economies (panel 1). The tightenings of the 1980s were followed by weaker growth in many emerging market economies (panels 2 and 3), but the situation was reversed with the higher interest rates of the mid-1990s, which were followed by stronger growth across the board (panel 4). The higher interest rates of the late 1990s were followed by lower growth among some emerging economies (panel 5). Finally, the most recent tightening period was followed by an acceleration in growth across all global economies (panel 6). Averaging across episodes, growth in the 1 The forecasting model is, for each country, a univariate autoregressive model for log GDP with four lags and a time trend. To avoid cluttering, some economies are grouped ex post into regional clusters, with a bar for the average GDP response across them.
2 For each country, the regressions start in 1960:Q1 or later depending on data availability, and are estimated using the full sample. The forecasts are computed dynamically-using the coefficients estimated for the full samplestarting from the last observation before the monetary tightening. The dynamic forecasts do not use actual data but exploit the hindsight of knowing the estimated trend growth and AR coefficients for the full sample.
United States and advanced economies was slightly higher than forecasted (+0.2 and +0.3 percent, respectively), whereas growth in emerging economies was slightly lower (-0.4 percent) in the years after these episodes. Additionally, the dispersion across episodes for emerging economies was twice as large as for advanced economies (standard deviation of 2 versus standard deviation of 0.9).
This large dispersion-across and between countries-suggests that not all tightenings are created equal. The nature of the tightening episode as well as country or region-specific characteristics could account for their heterogeneous responses. This is the perspective adopted here. In the first step, we extract interest rate surprises using quarterly data from 1965 through 2016 to isolate exogenous movements in U.S. interest rates that are unlikely to be correlated with either domestic or global economic conditions. 3 In the second step, we study how the spillovers to foreign economies of interest rate surprises depend on three factors: (1) the exchange rate regime against the dollar, (2) trade openness with the United
States, and (3) an index of external vulnerability. We use a panel for 50 advanced and emerging economies, and estimate spillovers using a local projections method (Jorda, 2005) . The interest rate spillovers are allowed to differ over time according to these three factors, and across emerging and advanced economies.
The paper's main results are:
1. The foreign spillovers of higher U.S. interest rates are large, and on average nearly as large as the U.S. effects. A monetary policy-induced rise in U.S. rates of 100 basis points reduces GDP in advanced economies and in emerging economies by 0.5 and 0.8 percent, respectively, after three years. These magnitudes are in the same ballpark as the domestic effects of a U.S. monetary shock, which reduce U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent after two years.
2. In advanced economies, higher U.S. interest rates are transmitted through standard exchange rate and trade channels. In particular, the responses within advanced economies are larger when a country's currency is (de facto) pegged to the dollar, or when its trade volume with the United States is high.
3. In emerging economies, exchange rate and trade channels explain little of the differential GDP responses within economies. Instead, a vulnerability index that we interpret as capturing a country's financial fragility explains a sizable component of differences across economies, with GDP in more vulnerable economies falling much more in response to a U.S. monetary tightening. This vulnerability index is constructed combining by current account, foreign reserves, inflation, and external debt.
Our estimation methodology exploits both the between-and the within-country variation in a set of observables that are often viewed as important determinants of the foreign spillovers of Similarly, several advanced economies were effectively pegged to the dollar before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and adopted a floating exchange rate regime afterwards. More recently, China abandoned its peg to the dollar in 2010, increasing its exchange rate flexibility.
Studies that ignore time-variation in these country characteristics are likely to estimate the effects of interest rate changes with a large amount of noise.
Section 2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the international transmission of interest rate shocks. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the methodology and results of the effects of U.S. interest rates shocks. Section 5 extends our methodology to look at state-dependent effects of interest rate shocks. Section 6 contains robustness analysis. Section 7 contains a historical quantification of the effect of U.S. monetary shocks on foreign economies. Section 8 concludes.
2 Channels of International Interest Rate Transmission
The Channels
Models of international interest rate transmission typically emphasize exchange rate channels, trade channels, and financial channels as key determinants of the response of foreign economies to changes in interest rates in another country. 5 The first two channels are a staple of virtually 4 For a list of papers that have examined the foreign effect of higher interest rates, see Kim (2001) , Canova (2005) , Dedola, Rivolta, and Stracca (2017) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) , Maćkowiak (2007) , Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008), and Georgiadis (2016) . See the Appendix. 5 We borrow this classification from Ammer, De Pooter, Erceg, and Kamin (2016) . Blanchard, Das, and Faruqee (2010) discuss a similar set of channels in accounting for the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on emerging economies. See also Kim (2001) .
all general equilibrium, intertemporal models of macroeconomic policy transmission that merge Keynesian pricing assumptions and international market segmentation building on the MundellFleming-Dornbusch framework.
6 Financial channels have been emphasized in recent work that has studied the international implications of various types of credit market frictions.
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The exchange rate channel is predicated on the idea of demand substitution between domestic and foreign-produced goods, and implies that higher interest rates in the United States may lead to an expansion of activity abroad. Consider, for instance, an increase in interest rates in the United States. Via the uncovered interest parity condition, higher U.S. interest rates lead to an appreciation of the dollar. In turn, the stronger dollar moves the composition of world demand away from U.S. goods and towards goods produced in other countries. With flexible exchange rates, GDP in foreign economies should rise, boosted by cheaper exports. By contrast, a country that pegs its exchange rate to the dollar should experience an appreciation that lowers its GDP.
The trade channel rests on the idea that higher U.S. interest rates reduce incomes and expenditures in the United States, thus leading to lower U.S. demand for both domestically produced and imported goods, and reducing activity and GDP abroad. Financial channels capture the idea that higher U.S. interest rates can spillover to the price of various financial assets and liabilities held abroad, thus affecting activity in foreign countries even after controlling for exchange rate and trade channels. For instance, when domestic agents are credit constrained and hold dollar denominated debt, an increase in U.S. interest rates may lead to a deterioration of domestic balance sheets in the presence of flexible exchange rates. 9 A common theme behind the financial channels is that frictions that prevent intertemporal smoothing through foreign borrowing and lending may magnify the impact of foreign shocks for economies that are integrated with the world markets. These frictions can be exacerbated when the fundamentals of a country are weak. For instance, high inflation may create political instability and constrain domestic monetary and fiscal responses to adverse shocks. Similarly, a large current account deficit or low foreign reserves may put a country at risk of facing financial pressure from foreign lenders.
Recent work has also highlighted the importance of global factors that can propagate changes in one country's monetary conditions to the rest of the world, especially when capital markets are highly integrated. Rey (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2017) show that changes in interest rates in "core" countries can trigger a global financial cycle that, regardless of the exchange rate regime, may generate positive global spillovers. Bruno and Shin (2015) find evidence of monetary policy spillovers on cross-border capital flows. This work highlights channels that seem to operate independently of, and above, the traditional exchange rate and trade channels.
Disentangling the Channels
Is it possible to tell these channels apart? Without loss of generality, consider an increase in U.S.
interest rates driven by an exogenous monetary shock.
If the exchange rate channel is important, the exchange rate regime should explain a substantial portion of the cross-country variation in GDP response following an increase in U.S. interest rates.
In particular, the traditional version of this channel predicts that a country that pegs its exchange rate to the dollar should experience a larger negative GDP response.
If trade channels are important, trade intensity with the United States should matter for the cross-country GDP response to higher U.S. interest rates, even after controlling for the exchange rate response. In particular, this channel predicts that higher levels of trade with the United
States will lead to a larger GDP contraction in response to an increase in U.S. interest rates, as the decrease in U.S. demand spills over to the exports of the largest U.S. trading partners.
All other transmission mechanisms fall under the category of financial channels. By financial channels, we mean mechanisms that stem from the presence of various forms of market imperfections and that operate above and beyond the standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model.
Suppose that we have already controlled for exchange rate regime and trade openness with the United States in assessing the foreign GDP response to U.S. interest rate shocks. We conjecture that, if additional financial variables can explain residual differences in how countries respond to U.S. interest rate changes, these additional variables are likely to capture the role of financial channels in international business cycles.
To what extent can we measure the strength of financial channels in the international transmission of monetary policy? Our strategy is to construct a summary indicator of variables that have a high probability of signaling the weakness in the economic fundamentals of a country. For practical purposes, these variables must be readily available and be somewhat consistently defined across countries and over time. In our analysis, we focus on four variables: a country's current account deficit, foreign reserves, inflation, and external debt. We combine these four variables in a summary indicator which combines them using equal weights, and we label this summary indicator the vulnerability index.
The above classification is obviously a simplification, and we illustrate potential pitfalls with one example. It is possible that the exchange rate channel matters but not through the standard dollar anchoring classification that we use. For instance, the exchange rate channel might be captured by trade invoicing, as discussed by Gopinath (2015) . 10 U.S. monetary policy might matter because exports and imports are priced in U.S. dollars regardless of the exchange rate regime. Channels of this kind-or broadly-based confidence channels based on the outsize role of U.S. monetary policy-could also capture residual differences in the effects of higher U.S. interest
rates, but we do not control for them in our analysis.
The Data
This Section describes the data used in our paper. Additional details on the sources are provided in the Appendix.
Data on GDP
Our main focus is on the effects of changes in U.S. interest rates on foreign real GDP. To this end, we put together a novel dataset containing quarterly GDP data for 50 foreign economies (25 advanced and 25 emerging) plus the United States. The coverage, which varies across countries, spans from as early as 1965:Q1 to as late as 2016:Q2.
Our benchmark analysis uses GDP data for the countries listed in Table 1 . For some countries, we extend backward the original, publicly available quarterly GDP series using annual GDP data that are available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. To convert the annual data into a quarterly frequency, we use Denton's proportional interpolation method (Chen, 2007) .
For emerging economies, the "indicator series" used for interpolation is the purchasing power parity (PPP) weighted GDP of the emerging economies for which quarterly GDP data are available. We adopt a similar procedure for advanced economies, where the interpolation method uses PPPweighted GDP of the other advanced economies (excluding the United States).
10 Long-span information on trade invoicing is scant. Gopinath (2015) 's index of trade invoicing starts in 1999.
3.2 Control Variables: The Exchange Rate Regime, Trade Openness, and Vulnerability Index.
Our analysis also focuses on how specific variables across countries affect the spillovers from interest rate changes to GDP outcomes. To this end, we compile data on the exchange rate regime against the dollar, trade openness with the United States, and other variables for all the countries in the dataset. We use these data to construct indexes of (1) exchange rate exposure, (2) trade exposure, and (3) external vulnerability.
1. For the exchange rate regime, we draw on the narrative analysis of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and
Rogoff (2017) and our own analysis of the literature to construct an index ranging from 0 to 1 for each country and period. We classify a country as 0 if it maintains a flexible exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, 1/2 if it maintains an exchange rate band, and 1 if it pegs against the dollar. In sum, the index takes on higher values the "more" a country pegs its exchange rate to the dollar.
2. For each country, we measure its trade openness with the United States by taking the sum of exports to, and imports from, the United States, divided by GDP.
Our external vulnerability index is an equally-weighted average of four indicators that we
use to measure the financial "health" of a country: 
Average Spillovers of Higher U.S. Interest Rates
In this section, we estimate the foreign and domestic spillovers of higher U.S. interest rates. We consider higher rates as a scenario in which the policy rate is higher than what could have been predicted using an estimated feedback rule.
12 In this section, we estimate the average international spillover of higher rates, while Section 5 discusses how this spillovers may depend on the economy's exposure to exchange rate, trade, and financial vulnerability channels.
Identification of U.S. Monetary Shocks
We identify U.S. monetary shocks by regressing the federal funds rate on a set of controls, and use the residuals as the identified shocks. In particular, we estimate shocks u t as the residual in following regression:
where r t is the federal funds rate. The set of controls Z t includes contemporaneous and lagged values of inflation, log U.S. GDP, corporate spreads, log foreign GDP, as well as lagged values of the federal funds rate and a quadratic time trend.
13 Because we include current macroeconomic variables as controls, our shock identification is analogous to a Cholesky identification in a VAR that orders the federal funds rate last, as done by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and others. 14 We use quarterly data from 1965:Q1 to 2016:Q2, and replace the federal funds rate with the Wu-Xia shadow rate from 2009 to 2015 to account for the zero lower bound and for the stimulus to the economy provided by the unconventional monetary policy actions that followed the Great Recession. 
Estimation of the Foreign Effects
With the identified monetary shocks at hand, we compute the dynamic responses of foreign and U.S. GDP using the local projection method developed by Jorda (2005) . This method allows us to compute the response of variables to shocks at different horizons without imposing many structural 13 We use four lags for all variables. Inflation is measured as the four-quarter change in the GDP deflator. Corporate spreads correspond to the difference between the Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield and the 10-Year Treasury note yield at constant maturity. We construct an index of foreign GDP by cumulating the average of quarter-on-quarter GDP growth for the countries in the sample. Each quarter, the weights are based on each country's GDP in constant US dollars from the World Bank World Development Indicators (if data for a country are not available, its weight is set at zero, and the weights of other countries are changed accordingly).
14 Our results below are robust to using the monetary shocks measure constructed by Romer and Romer (2004 For computing the response of U.S. GDP, we estimate the following equation:
where y t+h is U.S. GDP in quarter t + h, u t is the monetary shock, and Z t is a set of controls.
A plot of {β h } is the dynamic response of U.S. output to an innovation in u t . We also estimate equation (2) using the federal funds rate as y t+h to compute its response to the identified shock.
In both cases, the set of controls Z t includes four lags of y t and a quadratic time trend.
We take advantage of the panel dimension when computing the foreign GDP response to the monetary shock. In particular, we estimate a version of (2) as follows:
where y i,t+h is the GDP of country i in quarter t + h, and α i,h is a country-specific fixed effect.
Notice that we project all countries on the same shock u t . Accordingly, {β h } measures the average response of output across countries to an innovation in u t . Controls Z i,t include four lags of country i's GDP, as well as a linear and a quadratic trend.
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We are interested in documenting how responses to higher U.S. rates may differ across advanced and emerging economies. To this end, we estimate equation (4) separately for advanced and emerging economies. Figure 4 shows the response of U.S. GDP, the federal funds rate, and foreign GDP to a monetary shock. The shaded areas denote 68 percent confidence intervals and are based on robust standard errors that account for serial correlation (in the case of the U.S. responses) and for clusters by time and country (in the case of the foreign responses). 18 A shock that increases the federal funds rate by 1 percentage point induces a lasting decline in U.S. GDP, which contracts output by 0.7 percent after two years and recovers thereafter. The magnitude and duration of the U.S. output response to a monetary shock is largely in line with previous findings in the literature (Ramey, 2016) .
Results: U.S. Monetary Policy Matters
The dynamic response of GDP in advanced foreign economies follows a similar profile to the U.S. one, but is smaller and more delayed, with GDP dropping by about 0.5 percent three years after the shock. The GDP response of emerging economies is as delayed as that of the advanced economies, but eventually as large as the one in the United States, with GDP falling 0.7 percent four years after the shock. All told, the results highlight how emerging economies are more exposed than advanced economies to higher U.S. interest rates.
Foreign Effect of Higher U.S. Interest Rates: Disentangling the Channels of Transmission
We turn now to estimating how a country's dynamic response to a monetary shock depends on exchange rate, trade, and financial channels.
Methodology
Consider a set of variables v ∈ V that measure the exposure of an economy to higher U.S. interest rates, and let higher values of v represent higher exposure. To estimate how exposure affects the economy's response to a monetary shock, we extend the specification in equation (3) so that the identified shock interacts with the measures of exposure. In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
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The standardization step makes all the exposure variables comparable. The logistic transformation maps variables to the unit interval which allows us to consider them in distributional/probabilistic terms.
21 The re-centering step allows us to interpret the coefficients as deviations from median levels of exposure. In particular, β h is the response to the shock when all exposure indexes are at their median value, and β h + β v h is the response when the exposure index e v i,t is at the 95th percentile of its distribution.
The orthogonalization step eases interpretation and comparison with Section 4.3. In particular, because all the interaction terms are orthogonal to the shock u r t , the β h estimated in equation (4) is identical to the one from equation (3). Thus, we keep considering {β h } as the average response to the shock. Furthermore, because each additional exposure measure is orthogonal to the previous ones, we can interpret β v h as the marginal effect of variable v on the pass-through of the monetary shock to foreign GDP when v moves from the 50th to the 95th percentile of its distribution.
Exposure Variables
In practice, we consider three measures of exposure that capture the three channels discussed in Section 2.
1. Exchange Rate Channel: We construct a variable measuring the degree to which a country's currency is pegged to the dollar. The variable equals 0 when a country has a flexible exchange rate against the dollar, 0.5 if the country pegs against the dollar within a somewhat large band (+/ − 5 percent), and 1 if the country is closely pegged to the dollar (including a +/ − 2 percent band). We consider countries with a higher degree of anchoring to the dollar as more exposed to U.S. monetary shocks, as higher U.S. rates would induce an appreciation of the dollar-and thus, the domestic currency-which depresses GDP by making imports Balli and Sørensen (2013) for an application to regressions with interaction effects. 21 The logistic transformation is a simple manner to estimate the state-dependent effect of shocks that has been extensively used in recent work. See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017) and Ramey (2016) .
cheaper and exports more expensive. The median observation in our sample for advanced economies is a flexible exchange regime, which applies to 80 percent of the country-quarter observations. Instead, the median for emerging economies is a system with a close anchor to the dollar, which applies to 55 percent of the observations. 3. Financial Channel: We construct a vulnerability index as an equally-weighted average of the following four variables: current account deficit, foreign reserves (entering with a negative sign), inflation, and external debt.
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A large current account deficit may limit the willingness of foreign lenders to extend credit, or may even trigger sharp capital outflows, especially in the presence of high interest rates abroad. Additionally, evidence from Claessens, Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2010) indicates that large current account deficits raise the incidence and severity of a crisis.
Both credit risk agencies and international organizations frequently consider foreign reserves and external debt in assessing the external vulnerability of a country.. See for instance Santacreu (2015) . Additionally, there is evidence that both variables are important in capturing the sensitivity of an economy to adverse shocks. For instance, Frankel and Saravelos (2012) suggest that central bank reserves are one of the leading indicators in explaining crisis incidence across different countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) indicate that excessive reliance on debt finance may increase a country's actual and perceived vulnerability.
Although not a direct measure of financial channels, we also include inflation-measured by the annual change in the consumer price index-in our vulnerability index. High inflation may indicate structural problems in a government's finances, or could generate political instability which in turn acts as an amplifier of the effects of higher U.S. interest rate. High inflation may also increase the sensitivity of a country's borrowing costs to changing interest rates. For instance, Cantor and Packer (1996) find that inflation is a significant determinant of sovereign ratings.
22 Ilzetzki et al. (2017) also note that, by their classification, the U.S. dollar scores by a wide margin as the world's dominant anchor currency. 23 As an alternative to an equally-weighted average, we also considered the first principal component. The results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those presented here.
For each variable, we take a three-year moving average and truncate observations on both sides at a 5 percent threshold in order to remove outliers and to guard against extreme measurement error-to us, it seems immaterial whether a country has a 100 or a 1,000 percent inflation rate.
The three exposure measures are constructed separately for advanced and emerging economies. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the exposure variables in our analysis. The vulnerability index is constructed so that it takes on high values when foreign reserves are low, and when inflation, external debt, and the current account deficit are high.
To give a visual impression of the evolution of these indicators, Figure 5 plots the recent evolution of the three exposure measures for a selected sample of countries.
24 The figure showcases the evolution of our exposure measure over time and across countries, which allows us to measure the heterogeneous effects of U.S. interest rates. The top left panel shows how Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom have at some point in the past abandoned their peg to the dollar. The orthogonalization procedure merits some discussion. This procedure is a convenient method to illustrate the marginal effect of each exposure variable after controlling for the others. However, it also implies that the particular ordering of the exposure measures matters. We choose the ordering in a way that conforms closely to the historical evolution of the channels.
The exchange rate channel is perhaps the most intuitive and natural, and we order it first. The trade channel matters over and above the exchange rate channel, and we order it second. Finally, the financial channel is a residual channel that captures forces that operate beyond the standard channels, and we order it last. That said, there is little correlation in the data across our exposure measures. Therefore, we experimented with different orderings and found very similar quantitative results. Figure 6 shows the foreign GDP response to a monetary shock, as well as the marginal effects of varying each exposure measure from its median value to its value at the 95th percentile.
Results: Exposure Matters
The left column shows how the exchange rate channel affects the responses of foreign economies.
For advanced economies, moving from the median-corresponding to a flexible exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the dollar-to the high end of the distribution-corresponding to a dollar peg-24 In particular, we plot the logistic transformation of the original exposure variables after the second step, that is after truncation and before re-centering.
25 See Ilzetzki et al. (2017) , which we draw on for our classification.
more than doubles the drop in GDP following an adverse U.S. monetary shock. The response among the "high-peg" countries is mostly representative of the early part of the sample, when a large fraction of advanced economies were de facto pegged to the dollar. By contrast, the response of emerging economies is less sensitive to whether they peg to the dollar or not. We illustrate this point in the bottom left panel of Figure 6 . Of note, for emerging economies, median and high responses both identify countries that are anchored to the dollar. Nevertheless, the response of countries that are not pegged (shown by the black "low exposure" line) exhibits a similar pattern, with a delayed decline in GDP which bottoms out three years after the monetary shock. We next provide additional evidence for the channels by investigating how other foreign variables respond to a U.S. monetary shock. These exercises are shown in Figures 8 and 9 for foreign real exchange rate indexes and foreign short-term interest rates, respectively.
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In advanced economies (top panels of Figures 8 and 9 ), the exchange rate and the interest rate responses follow textbook predictions. The exchange rate appreciates for countries that peg to the dollar, while it depreciates for the (majority of) countries that maintain a flexible exchange rate regime. Peggers increase their interest rate almost one-for-one with the U.S. rate, which leads to an overall appreciation of their currencies. For peggers, the large increase in interest rates causes a large decline in GDP. In experiments not reported here, we also found that real exports drop more in countries that peg against the dollar and in countries that trade relatively more with the United States.
In emerging economies (bottom panels of Figures 8 and 9 ), the real exchange rate appreciates, and policy rates increase: although the peak increase of policy rates is about 50 basis points, policy rates increase much more persistently than they do in the United States. These effects occur regardless of the exchange rate regime. It is perhaps puzzling that the results for emerging economies suggest a significant appreciation of their real exchange rate in response to a U.S.
monetary tightening. To us, this puzzling result follows from the persistent increase in domestic interest rates in emerging economies.
Robustness
This section focuses on studying how the results regarding the foreign effects of an interest rate increase vary when we consider alternative sources of interest rate increases, alternative samples, or alternative monetary shocks. Figure 10 shows the impulse responses when the source of higher interest rates is a U.S. demand rather than a U.S. monetary shock. We compute the aggregate demand shock as the residual of a U.S. log GDP equation against a quadratic time trend, own lags, as well as lagged values of inflation, corporate spreads, log foreign GDP, and federal funds rate. The demand shock is better understood as any combination of supply and demand factors that increases U.S. GDP within the quarter after controlling for past domestic and foreign activity. U.S. GDP and U.S. interest rates When the source of higher interest rates is a U.S. demand shock, the initial foreign response is positive, although the "foreign multiplier" is smaller for emerging than for advanced economies.
Demand Shocks
In emerging economies, the positive spillovers of a positive demand shock are quickly offset by the negative spillovers of higher U.S. interest rates, and GDP falls below baseline after about one year.
Alternative Samples and Alternative Monetary Shocks
We now explore the robustness of the foreign effects of monetary policy shocks around our benchmark specification, which we use as a reference point. for advanced and emerging economies portray a similar picture: GDP initially increases in both blocs, before falling substantially below baseline after two to three years. Importantly, in both subsamples the maximum GDP decline is larger in emerging than in advanced economies, in line with the evidence for the full sample. Additionally, the larger uncertainty around the estimates in the later sample echoes several studies that find that after the 1980s the effects of monetary policy shocks have become more uncertain and harder to interpret (see for instance Ramey (2016) ).
It is interesting to compare the subsample results with the implications of our full-sample estimates that allow for time-varying exposure measures. Specifically, we compute the impulse responses by subsample by setting the exposure indexes of advanced and emerging economies to their average values in the two subsamples. The results using the median "exposure by period" are shown by the brown lines in Figure 11 . According to this alternative set of estimates, the effects of monetary shocks on advanced and emerging economies are slightly smaller in the second half of the sample, mostly because advanced economies have moved on average towards a "more flexible" exchange rate regime, and because emerging economies have become "less vulnerable"
in the second part of the sample. However, caution must be used in comparing the two sets of 27 Note that we re-estimate the monetary policy rule that we use to extract the monetary shocks across the two different subsamples.
28 See for instance McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Iacoviello, Schiantarelli, and Schuh (2011) .
estimates. When we split our sample, we are allowing for changes both in the monetary policy rule and in the effects of deviations from that rule. By contrast, when we only vary the exposure by period, we implicitly keep the systematic component of U.S. monetary policy unchanged, thus ignoring the effects of any change in the monetary policy rule itself.
Additional robustness exercises are shown in Figure 12 . In the top panel, we show the results when we replace the monetary shocks identified using the benchmark specification with the updated Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as constructed by Ramey (2016) In the middle panel, we return to our benchmark specification but truncate the sample in 2007:Q4, in order to limit ourselves to the pre-zero lower bound period. The results excluding the zero lower bound period are similar to the benchmark results.
In the lower panel, we change the quarterly interpolation method for the observations on GDP that are available at an annual frequency only. In particular, we retain Denton's interpolation method, but assume that log GDP follows a linear trend within the quarters of the year (subject to the constraint that the sum of quarterly GDP equals annual GDP). As the panel shows, the results barely change. 
Conclusions
Our results shed light on the relative importance of the exchange rate, trade, and financial channels in propagating the effects of U.S. interest rate shocks around the world. The traditional
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch view of foreign spillovers is consistent with the response of advanced economies. However, such a view appears at odds with the response of emerging economies, where trade and exchange rate exposure to the United States do not seem to matter. By contrast, the financial channels are very important for emerging economies, in addition to having a non-negligible effect on advanced economies.
Our findings also highlight both the bright and the dark side of foreign responses to U.S.
interest rate increases. On the dark side, these responses seem to be large, to the point that they suggest that foreign economies-especially vulnerable, emerging economies-may react to U.S. monetary shocks more so than the U.S. economy itself. On the bright side, they illustrate how countries that succeed in keeping their financial house in order can weather foreign shocks relatively better than their vulnerable counterparts. Note: The shaded areas denotes periods of interest rate tightenings. A quarter t contains a tightening if it satisfies any of the following criteria: (1) the FFR does not fall in t and rises by at least 20 and 40 basis points in quarters t − 1 and t − 2, respectively; (2) the FFR does not fall by more than 30, 20, and 10 basis points in t, t − 1, and t − 2, does not fall in t + 1, and rises by at least 20 and 30 basis points in t + 2 and t + 3; (3) the FFR rises by at least 100 and 200 basis points in t − 3 and t − 2, and rises by at least 100 basis points in t + 2. 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Trade with U.S. 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Vulnerability Index 1965 1975 1985 1995 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Trade with U.S. 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Vulnerability Index AFE Exposure Indexes EME Exposure Indexes Note: The indexes are constructed separately for advanced economies (AFEs) and emerging economies (EMEs). The vulnerability index is described in Table 2 . Note: The "median" response is the GDP response (in percent) of an economy with values for each index equal to the median value, as reported in Table 2 . The "high" response is the response of an economy with values for each index equal to the 95th percentile, as reported in Table 2 . The shaded areas denote 68 percent confidence intervals. Note: The "median" response is the response of the real exchange rate for an economy with values for each index equal to the median value, as reported in Table 2 . The "high" response is the response of an economy with values for each index equal to the 95th percentile, as reported in Table 2 . Higher values indicate an appreciation. The shaded areas denote 68 percent confidence intervals. Note: The "median" response is the short-term interest rate response of an economy with values for each index equal to the median value, as reported in Table 2 . The "high" response is the response of an economy with values for each index equal to the 95th percentile, as reported in Table 2 . The shaded areas denote 68 percent confidence intervals and are based on Newey-West standard errors that account for serial correlation. Note: The "Median" response is the GDP response of an economy with values for each index equal to the median value, as reported in Table  2 . The "High" response is the response of an economy with values for each index equal to the 95th percentile, as reported in Table 2 . The shaded areas denote 68 percent confidence intervals and are based on Newey-West standard errors that account for serial correlation. Note: The green bar is the "median" effect that is common to all advanced economies or emerging economies. The blue, cyan, and red bars are the marginal effects of the exchange rate, trade, and vulnerability channels, respectively.
